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NEWSPAPERS, IMPARTIALITY AND
TELEVISION NEWS
Intermedia agenda-setting during the 2015
UK General Election campaign
Stephen Cushion, Allaina Kilby, Richard Thomas,
Marina Morani, and Richard Sambrook
Drawing on a content analysis of television news and newspapers during the 2015 UK General Elec-
tion along with semi-structured interviews with the heads and/or senior editors of news or politics
from each broadcaster examined, we explore the intermedia agenda-setting inﬂuence of the
national press during the campaign. Overall, we found similar policy-orientated agendas, with
more stories emanating from right-wing newspapers and moments when front-page splashes
dominated television news coverage. Many broadcasters were editorially comfortable with covering
stories originating from newspapers if further context was supplied. Our ﬁndings do not point
towards any deliberate political bias among broadcasters. We suggest instead that a range of struc-
tural constraints and professional routines encouraged broadcasters to feed off stories that were
more likely to be supplied by right-leaning newspapers. Since news values are not politically
neutral, we argue that if journalists or editors routinely rely on newspapers to help shape the pol-
itical agenda it compromises their ability to make impartial judgements about news selection. Com-
bining quantitative and qualitative analysis, we conclude, could help to better understand the
editorial processes behind the selection of news and to more carefully interpret intermedia
agenda-setting than large N studies can supply.
KEYWORDS content analysis; elections; impartiality; intermedia agenda-setting; interviews;
newspapers; television news
Introduction
The role and perceived power of newspapers in the twenty-ﬁrst century can often
appear contradictory. On the one hand, debates about the future of newspapers regularly
focus on their limited lifespan, with dramatic headlines about declining levels of circulation,
falls in advertising revenue and predictions about the likely end of the printed press (Carr
2014). The imminent death of newspapers is usually viewed in light of ﬁgures showing an
enhanced use of online news or greater engagement with new content and social media
platforms, such as BuzzFeed and Twitter. From this perspective, the editorial reach and
power of newspapers appears to be fast diminishing, as people have greater choice and
freedom over what news they consume. On the other hand, newspapers or print journalists
remain a frequent reference point for rival news media, and a routine source for under-
standing how an event or issue is interpreted. Many broadcast news programmes, includ-
ing heavyweight political shows, not only review the day’s papers but ask journalists
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themselves to interpret the signiﬁcance of particular stories or to comment upon “the
mood” of the press in the wake of the latest political drama or breaking news story. Far
from the power of newspapers being diminished, from this perspective it appears newspa-
pers continue to play an important agenda-setting role in raising debate about the stories
they select and editorially frame.
On the face of it, discussing the editorial mix of news and opinions in the day’s news-
papers might appear a fair and transparent way of reﬂecting the national “debate” or “con-
versation”. After all, most Western democracies have what is commonly known as a “free
press”—a term used to denote a newspaper’s freedom of expression and editorial indepen-
dence. But, as research has long shown, many newspapers are far from editorially neutral or
even strive to be balanced (Bayram 2013). Indeed, many can be explicitly partisan, favour-
ing a particular political party or policy without counter-balancing alternative views or per-
spectives. For broadcasters conveying the day’s newspapers, this might not represent the
kind of diverse mix of news and opinions a “free press”might imply. Wider inﬂuences, such
as ownership and political afﬁliations, could play a role in shaping a newspaper’s agenda
(Hallin and Mancini 2004).
For broadcasters in the United Kingdom, which are legally required to report impar-
tially, this raises important questions about how far they should be informed by newspaper
coverage and journalistic commentary. The BBC’s impartiality, for example, is regularly
under attack from right- and left-wing perspectives, but debates are often informed by
anecdotal evidence rather than a systematic review of editorial output. By comparing tele-
vision news and newspaper coverage during the 2015 UK General Election campaign, the
aim of this study is to explore empirically the intermedia agenda-setting role of the press. In
doing so, we consider whether broadcasters’ editorial decision making was inﬂuenced by
newspaper agendas.
Impartiality is an important concept in this study. While generally it is a term
used to convey whether news is balanced or objective, in practice it can be difﬁcult
to measure or interpret empirically (Cushion 2014). We refer to it in a relatively
broad way to consider whether broadcasters covered stories pursued by left- or
right-wing newspapers during coverage of the United Kingdom’s 2015 General Election
campaign. Or, more generally, whether editorial decision making was inﬂuenced by the
news values—criteria journalists use to select one story over another (Harcup and
O’Neill 2016)—of particular newspapers. This is important in a UK context because
the majority of best-selling newspapers support the Conservative Party and champion
right-wing policies, such as tougher austerity measures, harsher immigration laws or
lowering taxes. Only a few newspapers, with a far lower combined readership than
right-wing newspapers, openly back the Labour Party and support contrasting left-
wing policies.
Drawing on a content analysis of television news and newspapers during the 2015 UK
General Election along with semi-structured interviews with the heads and/or senior editors
of news or politics from each broadcaster examined, we explore the intermedia agenda-
setting inﬂuence of the press during the campaign. Whereas many intermedia agenda-
setting studies rely largely on content analysis, we also wanted to question and interrogate
the editorial judgements made by some of the United Kingdom’s most senior broadcasters.
While our study cannot easily determine whether television news followed the agenda of
newspapers, where possible we empirically explore whether broadcasters’ editorial
decisions were inﬂuenced by press coverage.
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Although a key goal of the study was to explore the relationship between newspaper
agenda-setting and television news, we would acknowledge that online news or social
media platforms could also editorially inﬂuence television news coverage. Similarly, com-
peting television news outlets may inﬂuence their rival’s choice of stories, as well as cover-
age in newspapers. But the scope of the study was limited to rigorously exploring the
intermedia agenda-setting inﬂuence of newspapers on television news coverage.
Intermedia Agenda-setting: Understanding Editorial Inﬂuences Between
Media
Asking why certain issues gain public attention over others, agenda-setting studies
represent one of the most signiﬁcant areas of research not just in the discipline of journal-
ism studies but the inter-connected ﬁelds of communication, political science and media
scholarship (McCombs 2004). Evolving in theory and practice since the 1970s, agenda-
setting studies seek to establish empirically whether the media inﬂuenced public
opinion over time on issues such as climate change, immigration or during election
campaigns.
Although media impact on public opinion remains centre stage in agenda-setting
debates, a connected if less-researched line of enquiry includes interpreting agenda-
setting between media (Rogers, Dearing, and Bregman 1993). This is the object of our
study and has become known as intermedia agenda-setting, representing a new phase
of agenda-setting research (McCombs 2004). As of 2008, Vliegenthart and Walgrave
(2008, 861) suggested just “nine empirical studies focus explicitly on the process of inter-
media agenda-setting”, although they pointed out research exploring who set the media
agenda—political parties, say, journalists or members of the public—might also be rel-
evant. Of these nine studies, six were based on US media, with newspapers, magazines
and television news being the main media types analysed. Online news and more alterna-
tive newspapers were included in two studies. With the exception of Boyle (2001), studies
examining newspapers and television news found the former media type had some degree
of intermedia effect on the latter. So, for example, in the reporting of the “war on drugs”,
Reese and Danielian (1989) identiﬁed the front pages of the New York Times as especially
inﬂuential in framing coverage of cocaine on subsequent stories broadcast on US national
newscasts. Golan (2006), similarly, suggested a relationship between the countries featured
in New York Times coverage of international affairs and the following day’s agendas of CBS,
NBC and ABC evening news.
More recently, scholars have focused on intermedia agenda-setting in an increasingly
multimedia environment (Vonbun, Kleinen-von Königslöw, and Schoenbach 2015). Of
course, since the media landscape has radically expanded in the twenty-ﬁrst century, it
might be expected that online or social media sources have a greater intermedia agenda-
setting effect than “old” or “elite” media because they can publish news instantly.
However, evidence of this is not clear. Heim (2013), for example, examined political blogs
during the 2008 Democratic Presidential caucuses in Iowa. Rather than bloggers creating
new ways of analysing the race, the study argued they were “piggybacking on the work
on mainstream media, consistent with hyperlinking studies that have documented political
bloggers’ reliance on sources as such as the New York Times and Washington Post” (Heim
2013, 511). Meanwhile Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta (2008) identiﬁed evidence of blogs
shaping the agenda of newscasts during the 2004 Presidential election. Similarly, Conway,
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Kenski, and Wang (2015) established that Twitter feeds of major candidates involved in the
2012 US Presidential primary contest helped shape coverage in the leading US newspapers.
But both studies also found intermedia effectswerenot unidirectional butmultidirectional, e.
g. newspapers inﬂuenced Twitter and television news inﬂuenced blogging. However, Vlie-
genthart and Walgrave’s (2008) longitudinal study of television news and newspapers
between1993 and2000 inBelgiumcompared election andnon-election coverage and ident-
iﬁed intermedia agenda-setting was weaker during election times.
A more recent and comprehensive analysis of media during the 2013 Austrian elec-
tion campaign argued to the contrary by drawing attention to speciﬁc characteristics that
shaped the degree of intermedia agenda-setting (Vonbun, Kleinen-von Königslöw, and
Schoenbach 2015). Drawing on a semi-automatic content analysis of 17 daily newspapers,
14 online news sites, seven television programmes and the national wire service, APA, they
reached three key conclusions. First, online news was the main agenda-setter. Second, elite
or quality media did not regularly set agendas, with issues often shaped by other media
taking a lead. Third, two factors inﬂuenced intermedia effects, which included the proximity
of media (a local outlet reporting, for instance) and whether it is a story not widely observed
ﬁrst-hand by journalists (relying on rival reporters for knowledge). Viewed in this context,
macro (different mediums) and micro (locality of issues or exclusive nature of them)
factors shaped the intermedia agenda-setting process. However, Vonbun, Kleinen-von
Königslöw, and Schoenbach (2015) conceded that a major limitation of their ﬁndings—
and other strictly quantitative agenda-setting studies—was not interpreting how coverage
was followed.
As already acknowledged, our study also cannot clearly determine whether newspa-
pers inﬂuenced broadcasters’ editorial decision making. But in order to investigate more
closely whether television news resembled newspaper coverage, we need to consider
more qualitative ways of interpreting intermedia effects. For example, Lim (2011) devel-
oped a comparative study of US newspapers’ reporting of two breaking news stories,
asking whether competitors either ignored, followed or upgraded their own coverage.
The dominant response was to ignore their commercial rivals, but as Lim (2011) conceded,
the study only considered two fast breaking stories and just looked at newspapers rather
than between different media types. Informed by Lim’s approach, we intend to make quali-
tative judgements about some of the major stories reported by both newspapers and tele-
vision news bulletins during the election.
Overall, the explanatory factors shaping intermedia agenda-setting appear both
inconsistent and dependent on a range of contextual issues and characteristics that
shape the scope of the study, and the relevance of their conclusions. Our brief review of
the literature revealed that many studies were based on US news media, which have
unique characteristics including a broadcast media that are not legally required to be
impartial in coverage of politics; that recent studies tend to focus principally on online
and social media breaking news stories; and that many were largely quantitative in
scope comparing several media types, rather than more qualitatively exploring the
degree of intermedia inﬂuence within a particular media.
In a UK context, while there has been much speculation and commentary about the
inﬂuence of newspapers on broadcast news (Toynbee 2016), there has been little attempt
in media or communication scholarship to explore systematically and establish empirically
whether the press have had an intermedia agenda-setting inﬂuence on television news
generally or during a time period such as an election campaign. Loughborough University
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(2015) examined press and television news coverage of the 2015 UK General Election and
identiﬁed a similar agenda of stories between media, with many newspapers pursuing a
highly partisan approach to reporting. The majority of papers clearly supported the Conser-
vative Party, adopting an anti-Labour editorial stance and ferociously attacking its leader,
Ed Miliband. We also tracked television news coverage during the UK 2015 General Election
campaign, publishing a series of articles in The Guardian. While our content analysis
suggested the press inﬂuenced television news reporting during the campaign, we did
not explore the relationship between media content in detail or depth (Cushion and Sam-
brook 2015).
This study, by contrast, contributes not just a quantitative angle to intermedia
agenda-setting, but a qualitative dimension by interpreting how far broadcasters operating
with strict impartiality requirements conformed to or resisted the editorial power of the
press. In doing so, we are able to rely not just on textual evidence but on the editorial jud-
gements made by some of the United Kingdom’s most senior broadcast journalists to
understand the pressures and professional challenges they faced in their selection of
news and in safeguarding impartiality.
Of course, all UK public service broadcasters do not operate with the same regulatory
oversight. ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5, for example, are commercial public service broad-
casters and have speciﬁc licence agreements about their news provision, whereas Sky News
is a wholesale commercial broadcaster. Commercial broadcasters are regulated in a “light
touch” way by Ofcom. Fully funded by a licence fee, the BBC, by contrast, is a fully
blown public service broadcaster, mostly regulated by the BBC Trust and subject to far
greater scrutiny about the impartiality of its news coverage.
Our systematic study of television news—including the BBC—and newspaper cover-
age during the election campaign will assess the degree to which particular broadcasters
pursued an agenda similar to or distinctive from the national press. After all, in theory
the BBC is more likely to operate independently from its commercial counterparts who
might be more tempted to follow sensationalist stories pursued by the press.
Our research questions were:
RQ1: How similar was the policy agenda of UK television news with national newspapers
during the 2015 General Election campaign?
RQ2: Can an intermedia agenda-setting inﬂuence be identiﬁed between press coverage
and television news reporting?
RQ3: According to senior editors and heads of news at different broadcasters, did news-
paper coverage inﬂuence their editorial decision making during the 2015 UK General Elec-
tion campaign?
RQ4: Overall, to what extent did the press help set the agenda of different television news
bulletins during the 2015 UK General Election campaign?
Method
In understanding intermedia agenda-setting, most studies use large quantitative
content analyses to trace which media covered particular issues ﬁrst and how far the
NEWSPAPERS, IMPARTIALITY AND TELEVISION NEWS 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
7:5
0 0
5 J
uly
 20
16
 
medium shaped the message (e.g. social media break news fastest). Our approach focused
on one medium’s inﬂuence—the press—and was both quantitative (quantifying the sym-
metry of agendas between newspapers and television news) but also qualitative (consider-
ing some of the major stories in detail and interviewing either the heads of television news
or senior editors about the editorial power of newspapers).
We conducted two content analyses to compare television news and newspaper cov-
erage during the 2015 UK General Election campaign. Our content analysis of television
news bulletins included BBC, ITV and Sky News at 10 pm, Channel 4 at 7 pm and
Channel 5 at 5 pm, between 30 March and 6 May. This sample represents the United King-
dom’s main broadcasters with varying levels of public service obligations. While the BBC
has the most public service broadcasting responsibilities in the provision of news, an
inspection of the licence agreements of commercial channels reveals ITV and Channel 4
are broadly similar, with Channel 5 holding the least. Sky, by contrast, has no public
service broadcasting obligations.
In total, 2177 television news items were examined over the campaign period, of
which 843—38.7 per cent of all news—were election related. We coded every item as
either a policy issue or process story together with the story subject (health, economy,
etc.). Using Krippendorf’s alpha, we achieved a high level to credible agreement for each
variable: election relevance was 0.93 with level of agreement 0.97, policy/process was
0.82, with level of agreement 0.92, whilst story subject was 0.74, with level of agreement
0.82.
Our content analysis of UK national press coverage was more focused than television
news, as we identiﬁed policy stories published in different newspapers the day before they
were broadcast on evening bulletins. It was beyond the scope of the study to examine
every election item published in UK newspapers and match them with television coverage,
since this would have involved reading tens of thousands of articles.1 In order to interpret
the editorial agenda-setting power of newspapers, we primarily focused on television news
stories that could have been covered the previous day by the press. So, for example, since
many process stories relate to that day’s news (a campaign event), newspapers would not
have covered them.
However, a key process-related theme to emerge in post-election debates about
media coverage that we could not overlook was the attention paid to a possible Labour/
SNP coalition. The Conservative Party spent a good deal of campaign resources drawing
attention to this potential electoral outcome. The Labour Party, however, tried desperately
to avoid discussing this issue and complained to the head of BBC news about the promi-
nence paid to a Labour/SNP post-election deal in its election coverage. Post-election
debates also centred on the role of Conservative-supporting newspapers, with dramatic
front-page headlines about the implications of a SNP-minority government days before
election day (Cushion and Sambrook 2015).
The ﬁrst part of our intermedia agenda-setting study thus explored the extent to
which both newspapers and television news speculated on a Labour/SNP coalition, includ-
ing isolating relevant press reporting the day before television news coverage. This involved
re-examining all 505 process-related items in television news coverage. Our research team
watched every item to quantify each meaningful reference to (or subtle inference about) a
Labour/SNP coalition deal. We then used Nexis to search for terms such as “Labour”, “SNP”
and “coalition” to assess whether newspapers mentioned a Labour/SNP coalition.2 As
already acknowledged, simply because newspapers featured stories about a Labour/SNP
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coalition the day before a broadcaster does not mean broadcasters were inﬂuenced by—or
even followed—the press.
The second part of our intermedia agenda-setting study attempted to more closely
connect newspaper stories with subsequent television news coverage. Since many process
stories related to events happening on that day, it is unlikely they would have been covered
by newspapers the day before. Moreover, process stories, such as speculating about a poss-
ible coalition deal, would be difﬁcult to trace back to coverage in a speciﬁc newspaper. After
all, at any point in the campaign a journalist may have considered it relevant to speculate
about a Labour/SNP coalition. Since a key aim of the study was to assess whether speciﬁc
newspapers set the broadcast news agenda, we therefore excluded all process stories and
created a sub-sample of policy stories, such as a new housing announcement or health-care
proposal. This subset amounted to 140 different policy stories and generated 321 news
items between the ﬁve broadcasters. By story we refer to a speciﬁc issue, such as the
launch of a party’s manifesto, whereas news items refer to particular conventions of televi-
sion news (an anchor or reporter package, say, or live two-way). This meant, on some
occasions, different perspectives of the major evening stories were covered by several
news items. Once again, we entered relevant search terms into Nexis which related to
every policy item covered by broadcasters. Our research team spent a considerable
amount of time establishing which newspapers covered the same policy items as television
news and to help understand the nature of the major stories both media covered.
To move beyond a solely quantitative analysis of intermedia agenda-setting, we con-
ducted semi-structured interviews with the heads of television news or senior editors from
the BBC, ITV, Sky, Channel 4 and Channel 5, lasting between approximately 30 minutes and
one hour. This included Paul Royale, editor of BBC News at Six and Ten, Katy Searle, BBC
Westminster editor, Sue Inglish, the (now former) BBC head of political programming,
Geoff Hill, editor of ITV News at Ten, Michael Jeremy, head of ITV news, Ben De Pear,
head of Channel 4 news, Esme Wren, head of politics at Sky News and Christine Squires,
head of Channel 5 news.3 All interviews were conducted by the lead author of this
article within approximately six months of the election ﬁnishing. Of course, simply asking
interviewees whether they are inﬂuenced by newspapers generally or were during the elec-
tion was never likely to elicit a clear admittance (although, somewhat surprisingly, some
openly acknowledged the importance of monitoring the press’ agenda). Instead, we
referred to key moments in the campaign when high-proﬁle newspaper stories appeared
in coverage—such as a front-page Daily Telegraph splash about a letter from over 100
businesses supporting the Conservative Party—to interrogate editorial judgements and
to probe their decision making. Although this provided some insight into the selection
of particular stories, not all interviewees could recall in detail some of their editorial
choices or how coverage was shaped differently (or not) from newspapers. When they
did, we have included relevant responses in the ﬁndings.
Findings
Of the 505 election process-related items—from horse-race stories to more general
coverage about campaigning—we found close to one-third mentioned the possibility of
a Labour/SNP coalition deal (between 29 March and 6 May). Sometimes references to a
coalition deal were explicitly put by journalists, such as after a television debate when a
Sky News reporter said: “And then there was the extraordinary moment of a kind of
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Nicola Sturgeon love letter to Ed Miliband that was kind of unrequited, post-election nego-
tiation occurring already”. But the possibility of a Labour/SNP coalition deal was often more
subtle but implicit in coverage such as “Today Nicola Sturgeon told Sky News that Ed Mili-
band will need the SNP’s help if he wants to be Prime Minister” or when a politician said on
BBC news, “You can just imagine the chaos, the absolute chaos, if Nicola Sturgeon’s party
holds the balance of power”. The degree of speculation about a Labour/SNP deal during the
campaign was different between broadcasters, with the proportion of items mentioning
some kind of coalition deal on Channel 5 (24.2 per cent), BBC (27.7 per cent) and
Channel 4 (29.7 per cent) less than ITV (39.4 per cent) and Sky News (40.4 per cent).
We also found that newspaper coverage during the campaign was informed to a
large extent by the possibility of a Labour/SNP coalition deal. We identiﬁed 254 articles
mentioning a potential coalition. Of course, the overall amount of daily articles produced
by tabloid and broadcast newspapers is markedly different. But if we isolate the percentage
of times one story featured a reference to a Labour/SNP coalition every day of the campaign
(38 in total), broadsheet newspapers were likely to make them than tabloids: Times (60.5 per
cent), Telegraph (57.9 per cent), Independent (52.6 per cent), Express (26.3 per cent), Guar-
dian (68.4 per cent),Mail (50 per cent),Mirror (21.1 per cent) and Sun (28.9 per cent) (includ-
ing Sunday equivalents). Although the Mirror did not regularly draw attention to a Labour/
SNP coalition, the Labour-supporting Guardian published the most articles which refer-
enced a possible deal of all UK national newspapers. Of course, this did not take into
account tone and prominence. But, in the days before the election, we noted several Con-
servative-supporting newspapers running alarmist front-page stories about the conse-
quences of the SNP gaining power such as the Telegraph headline “Nightmare on
Downing Street”, juxtaposed with a picture of the SNP leader, Nicola Sturgeon.
However, interpreting whether the press—in particular Conservative-supporting
newspapers—had an intermedia agenda-setting effect in their coverage of a Labour/SNP
coalition is difﬁcult to establish. After all, the issue was pervasive throughout the campaign,
making it difﬁcult to trace back to a particular newspaper story. Nevertheless, when we
assessed whether any of the ﬁve broadcasters mentioned a Labour/SNP coalition the
day after a newspaper had over the course of the campaign (29 March to 5 May) we
found a high proportion of stories involving a reference to some kind of post-election
deal: Times (57.9 per cent), Telegraph (50 per cent), Independent (36.8 per cent), Express
(23.7 per cent), Guardian (57.9 per cent), Mail (42.1 per cent), Mirror (18.4 per cent) and
Sun (23.7 per cent) (including Sunday equivalents).
When quizzed about the prominence granted to the SNP over the campaign or the
wider fascination with a coalition deal, many of the interviewees were comfortable with the
amount of coverage their news team supplied. It was seen as a legitimate story because the
polling evidence suggested a Labour/SNP coalition was the most likely electoral outcome.
Some interviewees indicated a potential Labour/SNP deal had signiﬁcant news value
because the Conservative Party regularly drew attention to this possibility, while the
Labour Party struggled to rebut it. As Sky News’s Esme Wren and the BBC’s Katy Searle
made clear:
the SNP was a great story and I think what was interesting about it is that it was an issue for
both the Conservatives and the Labour camps, not only because when Miliband kept on
saying, “we won’t work with you, we won’t work with you”, and that was obviously in view
of a coalition but the way obviously the Tories made that one of their key themes… So, of
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course, yes, we did cover it. We did cover it in some quantity but I don’t think we went over
on it. (Esme Wren, Sky News)
Labour didn’t help themselves by the way they framed their own argument against the
SNP and that they consistently didn’t give a ﬁnal answer to it, which just wouldn’t shut
it down. (Katy Searle, BBC)
Again, it would be difﬁcult to isolate any newspaper inﬂuence here, except to say that
the news value of the coalition story was arguably legitimised or reinforced by the media’s
wider attention to it. The responses here also hint at wider inﬂuences at play, such as the
Labour Party’s campaign strategy, which we consider in our ﬁnal discussion.
Our analysis of every election policy story in television news allowed us to trace more
carefully whether broadcasters reported news published by newspapers the day before. Of
the 140 different policy stories covered by television news during the 2015 General Election
campaign, 44—31.4 per cent—appeared in newspapers prior to being aired. As a pro-
portion of time spent by bulletins on policy coverage, 61.1 per cent of airtime was dedi-
cated to covering stories previously published by newspapers. This reveals that UK
television news pursued a similar policy agenda to newspapers during the election
campaign.
In response to critics suggesting broadcasters were inﬂuenced by newspaper
agendas during the election campaign, most interviewees were quick to reject this accusa-
tion. However, several interviewees accepted that newspapers played a role in shaping tel-
evision news agendas during the election campaign or in political coverage more generally.
Katy Searle gave the strongest acknowledgement that newspapers can, if a story is per-
ceived to contain news value, have agenda-setting power:
do I accept that we follow a newspaper agenda? Sometimes. I think it’s true today as it
would have been during the campaign. There is, as you’ll know, the feeding off each
other kind of mentality a little bit because if someone’s going to get a story, if it stands
up, you’re going to look at it. But I hope that that is the same as the other way round
…my job is to make sure that we lead the news as much as possible but of course do
we pick up stories from the papers? Of course we do. But did we slavishly follow their
agenda? No, absolutely not. (Katy Searle, BBC)
Perhaps unsurprisingly, all interviewees rejected the suggestion they were inﬂuenced by
particular newspapers—namely the right-wing press—and suggested many journalists
read papers from all political sides. So, for example, the head of Channel Four, stated
that: “I think broadcast journalists probably read the Guardian as much as they read the Tel-
egraph so I don’t. I think the more partisan the papers were, the less we necessarily followed
them”. And yet, when broken down by which newspaper UK national television news was
most similar to, Table 1 reveals that a majority—62.4 per cent—of stories emanated from
right-wing newspapers combined, in particular the Telegraph and Times (or Sunday
equivalents).
Since the right-wing press outnumber left-leaning newspapers, on one level it is
perhaps not surprising that broadcasters reported more of the stories they published.
But it does conﬁrm that the United Kingdom’s evening bulletins pursued a policy
agenda that was more similar to right-wing newspapers—rather than the left-wing press
—during the 2015 General Election campaign.
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Of course, television news does not have a collective agenda, with broadcasters
pursing different angles and perspectives to election coverage. Indeed, this was reﬂected
in the 321 policy items we isolated during the campaign: the BBC made up more than
quarter of them—28.7 per cent—compared to Sky News (15.3 per cent) and Channel 5
(16.5 per cent). ITV and Channel 4, meanwhile, covered policy to a similar degree
(making up 19.9 and 19.6 per cent, respectively). But while the BBC had a more policy-
driven agenda, compared to rival broadcasters its 10 pm news bulletin was—as Table 2
shows—proportionally the least likely to report policy stories addressed by the UK national
press. The BBC, for example, included many citizen-led stories at the end of its bulletins
which often involved policy-related stories not covered by newspapers. Just over half of
the BBC’s policy items were published by at least one newspaper prior to being broadcast.
In contrast, the least policy-driven broadcaster, Sky News, was themost similar to the
press’ agenda. Nearly two-thirds of Sky News’ policy items—63.3 per cent—had previously
TABLE 1
Percentage of television election-related policy stories reported by newspapers prior to being
broadcast in UK national news bulletins
Newspaper
Percentage of times broadcast
story covered
The Daily Telegraph/The Sunday Telegraph (Conservative
supporting)
20.2
The Times/The Sunday Times (Conservative supporting) 16.3
The Independent/The Independent on Sunday (supported
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition)
15.4
Daily Mail/The Mail on Sunday (Conservative supporting) 12.5
The Guardian/Observer (Labour supporting) 12.5
Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror (Labour supporting) 9.6
Daily Express/Sunday Express (UKIP supporting) 6.7
The Sun/The Sun on Sunday (Conservative supporting) 6.7
Total 100 (N = 104)
Percentages have been rounded up. Total N represents policy stories covered by different
newspapers and at least one television news bulletin (e.g. not all 140 policy stories on television
were reported by the press).
TABLE 2
Percentage of election policy items in UK national television news bulletins previously
published in newspapers
Channel
Percentage of television news policy items that had been
published in a newspaper article prior to being aired
BBC 51.6
ITV 60.9
Channel 4 51.6
Channel 5 56.6
Sky News 63.3
Total N = 321
Percentages have been rounded up. N represents the proportion of policy items reported by each
broadcaster in stories covered by at least one newspaper.
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featured in at least one newspaper before being aired, with ITV not far behind (60.9 per
cent). Of the commercial broadcasters, Channel 4 were the most distinctive from the
policy agenda of newspapers (52.4 per cent).
As already established, the Telegraph and Times were the newspapers most similar to
the policy agenda of broadcasters. Table 3 further reveals that, with the exception of
Channel 4, every other broadcaster ran the most policy-related stories previously reported
by either the Telegraph or Times. But perhaps more striking was how broadly similar broad-
casters were in the extent to which they reported policy stories from the same newspapers.
Nonetheless, many interviewees explained they were comfortable with covering
stories pursued by newspapers if they had clear news value. So, for example, although
Esme Wren insisted Sky News does not follow the editorial line of any newspaper, she
did reveal that if a story was
out in the public domain, which they are if they’ve been printed in a newspaper, and
they’re signiﬁcant enough and we think that they’re capturing an audience or the
public, of course we feel that we would want to report on that. But then obviously
adding our own journalism to it to say the Telegraph or the Sun have got this, here’s
our correspondent who’s been speaking to sources or put it to the Prime Minister and
they’ve come back with this response because we can’t ignore a story if it’s in the
public domain.
This suggests that while broadcast editors were acutely aware of the partisan tactics of
newspapers and the political goals behind their scoops, if a story was deemed “signiﬁcant
enough” they would pursue it from their own journalist perspective.
TABLE 3
Percentage of election-related policy items in UK national television news bulletins published
by newspapers prior to being broadcast
Newspaper BBC ITV Sky News Channel4 Channel 5 Total
The Daily Telegraph/
The Sunday
Telegraph
18.0 19.5 24.2 25.0 19.7 20.8 (108)
The Times/The
Sunday Times
19.3 18.6 18.7 14.8 18.4 18.1 (94)
The Independent/The
Independent on
Sunday
14.7 14.2 13.2 15.9 14.5 14.5 (75)
The Guardian/
Observer
11.3 10.6 13.2 15.9 15.8 12.9 (67)
Daily Mirror/Sunday
Mirror
10.0 10.6 9.9 10.2 13.2 10.6 (55)
Daily Mail/The Mail
on Sunday
10.7 9.7 8.8 8.0 6.6 9.1 (47)
The Sun/The Sun on
Sunday
8.7 8.8 5.5 5.7 5.3 7.1 (37)
Daily Express/Sunday
Express
7.3 8.0 6.6 4.5 6.6 6.8 (35)
Total 100 (150) 100 (113) 100 (91) 100 (88) 100 (76) 100 (518)
Percentages have been rounded up. Column totals represent percentage (and N ) of items each
broadcaster covered from different newspapers. Row totals represent percentage (and N ) of all
television news items covered by speciﬁc newspapers.
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In making sense of the policy agenda pursued by newspapers and television news
during the election campaign, we need to look more closely at the type of stories originat-
ing from the press. After all, if particular newspapers—namely the Telegraph and Times—
broke major “scoops” during the campaign, it makes sense why broadcasters followed
their agenda.
Figure 1 illustrates the spread of policy-related news across the campaign and draws
attention to the major stories ﬁrst reported by newspapers and then broadcast by television
news.
Over the course of the campaign, Figure 1 reveals that a steady stream of election
items were reported ﬁrst by newspapers and covered later by evening bulletins. Towards
the latter part of the campaign the number of policy stories reduced because the campaign
agenda focused more on the process of the elections. But Figure 1 also shows notable
peaks and troughs when broadcasters and the press covered the same policy news.
Some of the peaks of Figure 1—when television and press were most in sync—can be
analysed further by examining 12 major stories (interpreted by time granted to it) over the
campaign, along with their prominence in the evening agenda and total airtime spent on it
in that night’s bulletin (see Table 4).
The policy story previously published in newspapers that generated most airtime on
television news over the campaign was about how the two main parties would fund the
National Health Service (NHS). From a newspaper perspective, it was a story based on a
Conservative announcement—an additional £8 billion in funding—that would be made
the following day. Of the 12 major stories, 9 were based on a policy announcements
about subjects relating to the economy, taxation, migration and the European Union.
These stories do not represent clear instances of intermedia agenda-setting, but warrant
closer scrutiny than a content analysis allows. It could be—as several interviewees’
claimed—that broadcasters supplied greater context and balance than newspaper cover-
age in these and other stories, but further close textual analysis is needed to support or
challenge their perspectives.
Subsequent post-election analysis has suggested some right-wing newspapers co-
ordinated with the Conservative Party on issues such as the right-to-buy policy and in
letters from leading businesses (Moore and Ramsay 2015). This was evident in two major
FIGURE 1
The number of policy stories covered by UK national television news bulletins previously
published in newspaper coverage during the 2015 General Election campaign, 30March
(day 1) to 6 May (day 38)
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TABLE 4
Twelve major stories covered by the press ﬁrst and then UK national television news bulletins including percentage of airtime gained and prominence in agenda
during the election campaign
Date Story
Percentage of airtime of all news
coverage that evening
Total percentage of all
news coverage Story order
1 April Letter from 105 business leaders originally
published on the Daily Telegraph’s front
page
Channel 5 = 21.7
Sky News = 23.3
Channel 4 = 14.6
ITV = 11.7
BBC = 14.1
16.2 2
2
1
1
1
1 April Labour’s policy on zero-hours contracts Channel 5 = 19.0
Channel 4 = 11.5
ITV = 6.0
BBC = 12.9
9.8 2
1
1
1
6 April “Monday back Monday”, a Conservative
pledge about reducing taxation
Channel 5 = 14.9
Sky News = 15.5
Channel 4 = 21.1
ITV = 30.1
BBC = 16.0
18.6 2
2
1
1
1
7 April Tony Blair’s speech on the EU referendum Sky News = 16.4
Channel 4 = 7.3
ITV = 18.1
BBC = 31.4
14.5 2
2
1
1
8 April Non-domicile taxation policy Channel 5 = 20.8
Sky News = 17.4
Channel 4 = 20.7
ITV = 18.5
BBC = 32.3
21.9 2
2
2
1
1
9 April Michael Fallon attack on Ed Miliband
character and deference policy
Sky News = 15.1
Channel 4 = 8.2
ITV = 17.5
BBC = 29.4
14.1 1
2
1
1
(Continued )
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TABLE 4
(Continued )
Date Story
Percentage of airtime of all news
coverage that evening
Total percentage of all
news coverage Story order
11 April Labour and Conservative NHS policy plans Channel 5 = 50.4
Sky News = 33.7
Channel 4 = 37.3
ITV = 34.2
BBC = 32.7
35.1 1
1
3
1
2
13 April Labour launch of manifesto Channel 5 = 36.3
Sky News = 23.9
Channel 4 = 10.7
ITV = 34.2
BBC = 17.6
21.7 1
1
1
1
1
14 April Conservative’s right-to-buy policy Channel 5 = 20.1
Sky News = 41.2
Channel 4 = 24.5
ITV = 26.8
BBC = 34.8
21.7 1
1
1
1
1
24 April Miliband speech on European migrant
crisis
Channel 5 = 11.3
Sky News = 13.6
Channel 4 = 46.3
ITV = 14.1
BBC = 20.2
22.7 1
1
1
1
1
28 April Ofﬁce for National Statistics ﬁgures on
slowdown of Gross Domestic Product
Channel 5 = 13.9
Sky News = 21.3
Channel 4 = 24.7
ITV = 10.6
BBC = 10.9
16.9 2
3
3
4
2
29 April Conservative promise not to increase tax
and VAT
Channel 5 = 15.8
Sky News = 12.8
Channel 4 = 3.7
ITV = 8.8
BBC = 19.7
11 2
2
2
2
1
For the Labour and Conservative NHS policy plans story (11 April), the coverage was over two days. ITV and Sky News covered the story in the evening broadcasts on 10 April
(a result of covering the next day’s newspaper headlines) whereas other broadcasters covered this story on 11 April.
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stories that were published by right-wing newspapers and had more than a hint of Conser-
vative bias. All evening bulletins reported towards the top of their agendas a front-page Daily
Telegraph letter from over 100 business leaders supporting the Conservative Party and a
Times interview with a Conservative defence secretary, Michael Fallon, who personally
attacked the Labour leader and his defence policy. In both cases broadcasters did not repli-
cate the partisanway the story was carried bymuch of the press. ITV news, in fact, drew atten-
tion to the partisanship of the letter towards the end of a report in a piece to camera:
When David Cameron and George Osbourne then turned up at Marsden’s brewery in Wol-
verhampton, whose chief executive had put his name to the letter, the extent of the co-
ordination become clear: there was nothing spontaneous about this. It was a carefully
planned piece of electioneering to ensure their central economic message was hammered
home… From the Conservative’s point of view, it means another day ﬁghting on their
chosen battleground: the economy. (ITV 10 pm news, 31 March 2015)
Interviewees were asked about why they prominently covered the letter from
business leaders, since it originated from an openly partisan source (e.g. Telegraph) and
clearly favoured the Conservative Party. In each case, they defended the validity of the
story because of the wider context they provided for viewers. So, for example, Sue
Inglish argued:
it was a perfectly legitimate story to follow and I think we reported it perfectly fairly. Wewere
also very clear about where it came from and we were completely clear about the fact that
there’d been Conservative Party involvement in it. (BBC head of political programming)
Similarly, Geoff Hill, said “I remember in the Telegraph it was quite a decent story because, it
was potentially clear where it came from, but there were a number of quite signiﬁcant
businesses behind there and we looked at that”. Christine Squires agreed: “business
leaders were writing letters… that is part of what’s going on, that’s part of the campaign
and, therefore, I feel no worry about reporting that at all”.
Another Daily Telegraph front-page letter was published on 27 April from 5000 small
businesses supporting the Conservative Party, but this was more sceptically received by
broadcasters. Esme Wren, for instance, said the Sky team
were speaking to those businesses, who [were] asked… to sign this letter and obviously
traced that back to Central Ofﬁce and made that the story to say, of course we know how
these letters come about. Central Ofﬁce calls 20 businesses and says can you sign this
letter? So the letter writing is quite an old tactic and we ﬁnd that quite dated and
exposed it for being so.
Regardless of the party political collusion, for Paul Royale the business leaders’ letter had
strong news value:
The business letter, I know there was a bit of argument because it was driven from Con-
servative Central Ofﬁce but then if 5000 small and medium-sized business leaders still
signed it, as long as you’re clear about that, as long as you say the origin of this thing,
it’s still got 5000 or however many it was to sign this thing. So I think there was a
version of the story where it may have appeared that they all spontaneously got this
thing together… they still managed to get these people. (Paul Royale, editor of the 6
pm and 10 pm BBC bulletins)
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When asked about why so much airtime and prominence was granted to an interview
Michael Fallon gave to the Times which attacked the Labour leader so personally, again
interviewees defended its news value but from different perspectives. According to
Geoff Hill:
the Fallon comments, I mean, it’s difﬁcult to ignore that kind of story when you’ve got a
really high-proﬁle member of party A making a really scathing personal attack about the
leader of the opposition party and it’s hard to ignore that. (Geoff Hill, editor of ITV 10 pm
bulletin)
Sky News justiﬁed the story by following up on it, rather than just accepting what was
written in the Times. The BBC, by contrast, ran an item about the attack, but also—according
to Paul Royale—focused on the implications for defence in light of the minister’s attack on
Labour.
Intermedia Agenda-setting Effects: Why Newspapers Can Distort the News
Values of Broadcasters and Compromise Impartial Judgements
Our content analysis delivered some clear-cut conclusions about how closely in sync
the agenda of UK television news was compared to national newspapers during the 2015
General Election campaign. First, almost a third of television news items appeared in news-
papers prior to being broadcast by television news. This proportion more than doubled
when interpreted by the amount of airtime spent by bulletins covering the same policy
stories as newspapers. Second, a clear majority of policy stories reported by broadcasters
emanated from right-wing newspapers. Third, broadcasters with the most public service-
driven responsibilities—notably the BBC—were proportionately the least likely to cover
the same policy stories as newspapers. Fourth, with the exception of Channel 4, every
broadcaster ran the most policy-related stories reported by the Telegraph or Times (or
Sunday equivalents). Fifth, while most days of the campaign broadcasters reported
stories covered by newspapers, there were clear moments during the campaign when tele-
vision news coverage followed stories originating in the press. Overall, our ﬁnding reinforce
many previous intermedia agenda-setting studies that demonstrated newspapers, in par-
ticular quality or broadsheet titles, act as opinion-leaders (Vliegenthart and Walgrave
2008). Similarly, quality public service media—notably the BBC—were proportionally the
least likely to follow the press’ agenda.
Our study about the intermedia agenda-setting role of newspapers in coverage of a
possible Labour/SNP coalition was less clear cut. While we found television news coverage
was regularly informed by speculation about a possible coalition deal the day after many
newspapers also covered this issue, it was hard to trace empirically clear instances where
newspapers inﬂuenced broadcast coverage. The possibility of a Labour/SNP coalition was
widely reported throughout the campaign—particularly on Sky News and ITV—and per-
ceived as a legitimate news story by journalists. But a more systemic intermedia agenda-
setting effect might have occurred in a more indirect way. Since newspapers were regularly
speculating about a Labour/SNP coalition during the campaign, it could have legitimised
the news values of broadcasters to also cover the possibility of a post-election deal
between these parties.
Nevertheless, in conventional intermedia agenda-setting studies our study of policy-
related coverage could be interpreted as evidence that television news followed the UK
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national press agenda during the campaign. After all, put in the language of traditional
agenda-setting parlance (McCombs 2004), newspapers appeared to transfer the salience
of particular issues—notably about the economy—on to the broadcast media. While our
content analysis study cannot assume causality between press inﬂuence and television
news coverage, the close alignment of agendas between media over the campaign and
the acknowledgement by broadcast editors that they would follow up on newspaper
stories if they had sufﬁcient news value does suggest an intermedia agenda-setting was
apparent during the 2015 UK General Election. But our aim was to qualify further the
nature of any transfer of agendas between the press and television news, and to interpret
it in more qualitative detail than often large N studies can reasonably supply.
Based on our closer assessment of the major stories reported by the press and tele-
vision, and interviews with the heads of television news broadcasters or senior editors, our
ﬁndings do not support the view that UK television news bulletins submissively followed
the editorial agenda of newspapers or fell under the spell of right-wing newspapers
during the election campaign. But since television news bulletins have to remain impartial
in coverage of the election campaign, it perhaps makes them more susceptible to being
inﬂuenced by the press’ agenda rather than the other way round because broadcast
editors might be reluctant to lead on politically sensitive stories. And yet, despite repacka-
ging many partisan led-stories and more impartially covering the policy positions of parties
than the press, our study empirically demonstrated that television news pursued a similar
agenda to UK newspapers during the election campaign and followed their lead on some of
the major stories. We do not consider that this evidence amounts to any deliberate political
bias amongst broadcasters or fuel that can fan the ﬂames of left- or right-wing conspiracy
theorists. In our view, it is structural constraints and professional routines that encourage
broadcasters to feed off stories that are more likely to be supplied by right-leaning news-
papers (because they outnumber left-leaning competitors), and pursue issues and concerns
more likely to favour a Conservative Party agenda.
The structural constraints of broadcasters, of course, are obvious when compared to the
press. Newspapers typically lead the morning agenda, having been published late into the
night or updated early in the morning, and they have more physical space to cover stories
than many competitors such as a television news bulletin. Given, as the BBC’s Sue Inglish
pointed out, the ever-quickening pace of the news cycle, it might seem unlikely today that
evening bulletins would be inﬂuenced by stories reported either the night before or much
earlier thatmorning. But our study revealed that the salience ofmany election stories reported
by newspapers remained strong throughout the day and were reported either on the early or
late evening bulletins. Put another way, despite the pace and ﬂuidity of today’s news cycle,
and the highly fragmented and hybrid media systems inﬂuencing and reshaping stories
(Chadwick 2013), we found the morning newspapers continued to share a similar agenda
to the evening television news bulletins during the 2015 General Election campaign.
In many cases, the election stories reported ﬁrst by newspapers and then covered by
broadcasters were policy announcements from parties. In this sense, the symmetry
between newspapers and television news might appear a relatively innocent act or rep-
resent a benign intermedia agenda-setting effect. But our study found moments when
broadcasters explicitly followed stories originating in newspapers that were more advan-
tageous to—or even published in collusion with—a particular political party (Moore and
Ramsay 2015). We should not overlook other factors, of course, that shaped the selection
of news stories. While the Conservative Party ran a well-funded and highly sophisticated
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election strategy, the Labour Party’s campaign has been criticised for not effectively com-
municating its message or staging events deemed newsworthy (Scammell 2015). Unlike the
Conservative Party, Labour struggled to appeal to broadcasters’ news values—a point
raised by several of our interviewees.
At the same time, the reliance on news values does represent a departure from a
public service duty of reﬂecting party messages (Semetko et al. 1991) to selecting them
based on professional judgements. It is this, above all, that helps explain the intermedia
agenda-setting role of the press during the election. For many interviewees were comfor-
table with reporting stories originated in newspapers if they had perceived news value. To
paraphrase Esme Wren, if news is in the public domain—from newspapers or elsewhere—
why shouldn’t broadcasters follow up on it? While this might appear a reasonable pro-
fessional judgement, news values are far from politically neutral. We found, for example,
a clear majority of stories broadcast on television news emanating from right-wing news-
papers, rather than being balanced out by left-leaning titles.
If broadcasters increasingly rely on the news values of partisan newspapers to inform
their impartial judgements, it could lead to ideologically narrowing the agenda of issues
citizens encounter in media coverage. So, for example, we identiﬁed two election stories
reported in more centre to left-wing newspapers—a Guardian letter written by more
than 140 health professionals attacking the government’s record on the NHS and a poll
of leading economists questioning the government’s austerity measures reported in The
Independent—that did not receive the same amount of airtime or prominence as
similar stories published by right-wing newspapers. When discussed with some of the inter-
viewees, the response was that both stories did not carry sufﬁcient news value. What
remains an open question is whether their news judgement would have been different if
either story had been more substantially covered by the wider (right-wing) press.
This also points to the limitations of our study. Like studying any effect, interpreting
intermedia agenda-setting is not empirically easy to disentangle. Whether policy
announcements, speculation about coalition deals or letters written to newspapers, inter-
media agenda-setting studies have to consider carefully the multiplicity of processes and
consequences which shape news agendas. Nevertheless, our study identiﬁed clear
moments during the campaign when the press set the television news agenda and
revealed editors were more than comfortable relying on press stories if they were
deemed newsworthy. Since the UK press reﬂect a more right-wing view of the world, we
concluded that relying on their news values to inform editorial judgements risks undermin-
ing the impartiality of broadcasters. The effect of our intermedia agenda-setting study, in
other words, has clear ideological implications.
Our wider contribution to intermedia agenda-setting debates aimed to move beyond
relying solely on a large-scale content analysis by considering some of the major stories
when different media agendas converged and by interviewing some of the most senior edi-
torial ﬁgures in UK broadcasting about the editorial power of the press. Future studies
should consider combining quantitative and qualitative analysis to understand better the
editorial processes behind the selection of news and to more carefully interpret intermedia
agenda-setting.
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NOTES
1. UK national newspapers included in this study were The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The
Independent, Daily Express, The Guardian, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Sun and each of
their Sunday publications.
2. Our Nexis search represents a conservative estimate of all newspaper stories mentioning a
Labour/SNP coalition. It was beyond the scope of the study to detect all subtle references
made in newspaper coverage and our search terms may explain the differences between
tabloid and broadcast coverage.
3. Esme Wren from Sky News was only available for a phone interview.
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